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Abstract 
Heterogeneity emerges when multiple close or conceptual replications on the same subject 
produce results that vary more than expected from sampling error. Here we argue that 
unexplained heterogeneity reflects a lack of coherence between the concepts applied and data 
observed, and therefore a lack of understanding of the subject matter. Consequently, typical 
levels of heterogeneity offer a useful but neglected perspective on levels of understanding 
achieved in psychological science. Focusing on continuous outcome variables, we surveyed 
heterogeneity in 150 meta-analyses from cognitive, organizational, and social psychology and 
57 multiple close replications. Heterogeneity proved very high in meta-analyses, with 
powerful moderators being conspicuously absent. Population effects in the average meta-
analysis vary from small to very large, for reasons that are typically not understood. In 
contrast, heterogeneity was moderate in close replications. A newly identified relationship 
between heterogeneity and effect size allowed us to make predictions about expected 
heterogeneity levels. We discuss important implications for the formulation and evaluation of 
theories in psychology. Based on insights from the history and philosophy of science, we 
argue that reduction of heterogeneity is important for progress in psychology and its practical 
applications, and we suggest changes to our collective research practice towards this end. 
 
keywords: meta-analysis; heterogeneity; replication; statistical power; philosophy of science; 
psychological research. 
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Heterogeneity of Research Results as a New Perspective to Assess and Promote Progress in 
Psychological Science 
Meta-analysis, which seeks to summarize results of multiple studies into the same 
phenomenon, has become an indispensable tool in contemporary research. In pioneering 
work, Smith and Glass (1977) showed that psychotherapy has a strong positive effect on the 
average patient studied, and Schmidt and Hunter (1977) demonstrated that the validity of 
employment tests generalize more readily across different job types than previously believed. 
Influential surveys of meta-analyses demonstrated the effectiveness of psychological 
interventions (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993), provided effect size benchmarks for social 
psychology (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003), and summarized findings on 
psychological gender similarities (Hyde, 2014). Here, we provide a survey of meta-analyses 
that shifts the perspective from the mean effect size in a population of studies (i.e. how large 
is the average effect in a particular domain?) to the heterogeneity of results (i.e. how much do 
results differ across studies into the same issue?). In any meta-analysis, heterogeneity 
indicates to what extent the summarized studies tap into the same population effect size. If 
they investigate the same population effect size, heterogeneity will be zero. Even in this case, 
sampling error will create differences in observed effects across studies. Zero heterogeneity is 
inferred where these observed differences do not exceed the level expected due to sampling 
error. Consider the effectiveness of psychotherapy as an example. If heterogeneity was zero, 
the effectiveness of psychotherapy would be the same across all studies, regardless of the 
issue patients present with (e.g. anorexia, depression, specific phobia), the type of therapy 
they receive (e.g. cognitive-behavioral, psychoanalytic), and other differences. Obviously, 
this is unrealistic; for example, some conditions are treated more successfully than others 
(Huhn et al., 2014). Heterogeneity then reflects how much the population effect sizes differ 
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across studies. We provide a formal treatment of heterogeneity later, but Figure 1 provides 
examples with high and low heterogeneity. 
 Heterogeneity tends to receive little attention from researchers (Aytug, Rothstein, 
Zhou, & Kern, 2012; Dieckmann, Malle, & Bodner, 2009; Ioannidis, 2008), but we argue 
here that much is to be gained from its study because a) heterogeneity reflects the degree of 
understanding of the subject matter being investigated, and b) its study offers useful 
suggestions regarding the improvement of our collective research practice. 
Why Heterogeneity Matters 
 Low (as opposed to high) heterogeneity reflects a more advanced understanding of the 
subject matter being studied. This is because high heterogeneity, at least as long as it remains 
unexplained, suggests the lack of a strong coherence between the concepts applied and the 
data observed. Take visuo-spatial skills in people with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) as 
an example (Muth, Hönekopp, & Falter, 2014). In line with current theorizing, the average 
study found (moderately) better visuo-spatial performance in people with ASC than in IQ-
matched controls on a number of standardized tasks. At the same time, heterogeneity of 
results proved high even for the same task. Not accounted for by any theory, this random 
variation in study results (which might be down to unrecognized variability in ASC, 
unreliability in diagnosis, or other factors) points to a shortcoming in our understanding. It 
also implies that the result of the next study into the same question is highly unpredictable 
(i.e. over and above the uncertainty arising from sampling error).  
Moreover, low heterogeneity should facilitate future progress for two reasons. First, a 
clear structure in observable data can in itself guide understanding – a point stressed by 17th 
century luminaries Francis Bacon and Newton as well as modern philosophers of science 
such as Reichenbach, Hanson, and Simon (Schickore, 2018; Simon, 1973). For example, the 
19th century astronomer William Huggins observed that the light of different stars, when seen 
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through a prism, shows the same set of spectral lines; but these are collectively shifted to 
varying degrees. The observation of this systematic redshift pattern led to the discovery that 
stars move away from us and at different speeds (Schneider, 2014). Sixty years later, Edwin 
Hubble observed that the degree of stars’ redshift is linearly related to their distance from us, 
which led to the discovery that the universe is expanding (Schneider, 2014). Skinner (1956) 
and Stevens (1957) provide prominent examples for a guiding role of orderly observation 
data in psychology. Second, the systematic violation of expectations has often proved crucial 
for scientific discovery (Kuhn, 1970). Thus, the failure of an increasingly convoluted 
Ptolemaic system to further improve the predictions of astronomic events motivated 
Copernicus to devise a new, heliocentric model of the cosmos; and the failure to detect 
expected changes in the speed of light – derived from the idea that light propagates through a 
medium – led Einstein to abandon the idea of a luminiferous ether and to fundamentally 
rethink physics. As captured in Bacon’s dictum that “truth emerges more readily from error 
than from confusion” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 57), such anomalies cannot emerge where theoretical 
concepts and observed data lack a clear connection in the first place.  
We therefore propose heterogeneity as a useful perspective from which to judge the 
success of psychological science, alongside other yardsticks such as the generation of good 
theories (Wallis, 2015), the design of successful interventions (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993), and 
beneficial contributions to policy design (Fischhoff, 1990). Thus, heterogeneity is of 
considerable intrinsic value, which is why we seek to systematically measure this in 
psychological research results here. What are typical levels? Do they differ across domains, 
and if so, can we make sense of these differences? Apart of its intrinsic value, knowledge of 
actual levels of heterogeneity has immediate practical implications: Recent work 
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demonstrated that heterogeneity typically decreases the statistical power of studies1, i.e. any 
real effect under investigation is less likely to produce a statistically significant result (Kenny 
& Judd, 2019; McShane & Böckenholt, 2014; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). For sample size 
planning to take this into account, reliable estimates of heterogeneity are needed, which we 
supply here. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our findings have clear implications for 
improving our collective research practice, as we will discuss at the end of our paper. 
Before we can address the details of our study, it is necessary to deal with a number of 
critical points, which we address in the next sections. 
Moderators 
 Importantly, heterogeneity reflects a lack of understanding only where it remains 
unaccounted for. Let us reconsider our example of psychotherapy effectiveness. A meta-
analysis that summarizes all sensible studies should find large heterogeneity because these 
studies will differ in key variables like the issue being treated, the therapy being used, etc. If 
this heterogeneity can be explained by moderators (e.g. that effectiveness differs strongly 
across treated disorders or across types of psychotherapy), obviously this no longer indicates 
a lack of knowledge. (On the contrary, it might be argued that explained heterogeneity 
reflects a progress in understanding.) To date, we are not aware of any study which 
systematically investigates to what extent heterogeneity that is observed in a set of studies is 
accounted for by moderators. We therefore investigate this here. 
Conceptual versus Close Replications 
Heterogeneity as a concept only makes sense if the set of studies for which it is 
computed can, in some sense, be conceived as replications of each other. In this context, the 
 
1 This is because the gain in power for larger-than-expected effects is less than the loss in 
power for smaller-than-expected effects. 
HETEROGENEITY AS A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON PROGRESS 
7 
 
differentiation of close and conceptual replications has become fruitful (Schmidt, 2009; 
Zwaan, Etz, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2018). The former seek to replicate an earlier study as 
faithfully as possible. The Open Science Collaboration (OSC, 2015) project is a famous 
example. In a massive collaborative effort, the authors sought to replicate 100 studies 
recently published in high profile psychology journals. The replications sought to copy study 
materials, data analyses, and other key aspects of the original studies as closely as possible 
and can therefore be considered close replications. In contrast, the studies summarized in a 
meta-analysis can typically be considered to be conceptual replications (Schmidt & Oh, 
2016), i.e. whilst they address the same topic or mechanism, they often differ markedly 
regarding their design, study materials, participants, data analysis, and other key aspects. 
Consequently, heterogeneity should tend to be larger in conceptual replications than in close 
replications. 
A systematic comparison of heterogeneity in close and conceptual replications should 
be instructive. For example, Stanley, Carter and Doucouliagos (2018) argued that the low 
replicability observed in the OSC (2015) project might reflect low power caused by high 
heterogeneity. However, the heterogeneity data that they presented in support of this 
argument stemmed almost exclusively from conceptual replications. Their assumption that 
heterogeneity in close replications attempts might be similar rested on only two examples for 
the latter.   
Note that the heterogeneity for each of the 100 twin studies in the OSC (original and 
replication) cannot be estimated reliably. Instead of a single replication, this would require 
multiple close replications of the same effect (e.g., Klein et al., 2014). Consequently, we use 
such Many-Labs type replications to study heterogeneity in close replications.  
Measuring Heterogeneity 
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So far, we have not addressed how heterogeneity can be quantified. In psychology the 
idea of heterogeneity is usually discussed in the context of standardized effect sizes (e.g. 
Cohen’s d instead of a difference between group means in raw scores), and we stick to this 
perspective here. Two established approaches to quantify heterogeneity are I2, and τ. Before 
we deal with them, it is helpful to consider what we should expect to see in the absence of 
heterogeneity. Even if all primary studies tap into the same population effect size, we expect 
to see differences in the observed effect sizes due to sampling error. Thus, observed 
differences between effect sizes do not necessarily point to heterogeneity. 
The first approach, I2, estimates the percentage of observed effect size variability that 
reflects real differences in effect sizes. Where I2 is near zero, the observed variability is 
mostly down to sampling error; where I2 is near 100, most of the observed variability reflects 
differences in population effect sizes. However, I2 does not discriminate well when 
heterogeneity is large (Huedo-Medina, Sánchez-Meca, Marín-Martínez, & Botella, 2006). 
Moreover, I2 depends on the sample size in the primary studies (Borenstein, Higgins, Hedges, 
& Rothstein, 2017; IntHout, Ioannidis, Borm, & Goeman, 2015). Imagine that all studies 
used small samples. Individual effect sizes will scatter widely around their population effect 
size. Consequently, a large percentage of observed variability reflects sampling error and I2 
will be low. Now imagine that all studies used very large samples. Each study will provide a 
highly accurate estimate of its population effect size. Consequently, only a small percentage 
of observed variability reflects sampling error and I2 will be high. Finally, for the current 
study, our approach to heterogeneity involves summarizing heterogeneity estimates across 
multiple meta-analyses. Using I2 in this way strikes us as questionable unless average sample 
sizes are similar.  
The second approach directly estimates the variability in population effect sizes. It is 
generally assumed that population effect sizes relating to a given phenomenon follow a 
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normal distribution; tau (τ) refers to their standard deviation (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2009), and can be calculated when individual study effect sizes and standard errors 
are available. As an example, consider the meta-analysis in the right panel of Figure 1. The 
standard deviation of the observed effect sizes in the primary studies is 0.36. (For the sake of 
consistency, we use Cohen’s d as a measure of effect size in this example and throughout our 
paper.) Some of the observed effect size variability must be down to sampling error. When 
this is removed, heterogeneity is estimated as only 0.11. To better understand heterogeneity, 
reconsider Figure 2. Here, the mean for the population of true effect sizes is δ = 0.45 and their 
standard deviation is 0.33, therefore τ = 0.33. The standard deviation roughly reflects how far 
data points are, on average, away from the mean. Consequently, any study’s population effect 
size will typically deviate from 0.45 by approximately 0.33; also, the 95% credibility interval 
ranges from -0.20 to 1.10, estimating that 95% of all population effect sizes fall into this 
bracket (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). As τ is independent from Ns in primary studies (which 
differ markedly between meta-analyses) and τ, unlike I2, is on an equal interval scale which 
allows meaningful computations of means, we use it here2.  
Being an unknown population parameter, τ has to be estimated. Its estimator T often 
comes with considerable uncertainty, especially when a meta-analysis is based on few studies 
(e.g. Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). For individual meta-analyses this can be a serious issue, 
especially when heterogeneity is wrongly estimated to be zero (Chung, Rabe‐Hesketh, & 
Choi, 2013). However, this is less of a concern for us here, because our focus is not on 
individual meta-analyses but on aggregates of 50 or more, and we do not believe there is 
 
2 Indeed, across 141 meta-analyses based on Cohen’s d, I2 and T correlated only moderately 
at r = .39 (van Erp, Verhagen, Grasman, & Wagenmakers, 2017). 
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reason to suggest that heterogeneity estimates will be consistently biased in one direction (see 
Hönekopp and Linden, 2019). 
A Sensible Sampling Frame 
What is a sensible sampling frame for a survey of heterogeneity? One potential 
strategy would be to use a representative sample of meta-analyses across all of psychology. 
However, our heterogeneity measure T is not suitable for odds-ratios and similar effect sizes, 
which are frequently used in clinical psychology. Consequently, a sample of meta-analyses 
amenable to our heterogeneity measure would fail to be representative. We therefore decided 
to focus on a number of sub-fields instead in which effect size measures d and r, for which 
our heterogeneity measure works, predominate. We chose cognitive, social, and 
organizational psychology because they differ in their relative emphasis on fundamental 
versus applied research and because they were the focus of recent meta-scientific inquiry 
(Mitchell, 2012; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Mitchell (2012) compared effect sizes 
from laboratory-based and field-based studies in organizational and social psychology. The 
correlation between lab- and field-based effect sizes was higher in the former (r = 0.89) than 
in the latter (r = 0.53). Open Science Collaboration found that cognitive psychology findings 
replicated substantially better than social psychology findings. These observations could 
point to greater heterogeneity within social psychology in general. Indeed, Stanley et al. 
(2018) argued that the low replication rate observed in the Open Science Collaboration might 
reflect low power caused by high heterogeneity. From this perspective, the difference in 
observed Open Science Collaboration replication rates would then suggest higher 
heterogeneity in social psychology as compared to cognitive psychology. We test this idea 
here.  
Aims 
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To summarize, our aims are as follows. Given its intrinsic value as an indicator of a 
lack of understanding, we seek to establish typical levels of heterogeneity in conceptual 
replications. We compare these across the sub-fields of cognitive, organizational, and social 
psychology, and against heterogeneity observed in close replications. We also investigate to 
what extent heterogeneity in a set of studies can typically be accounted for by moderators. 
We further explore if any characteristics explain differences in heterogeneity.  
To foreshadow our key results, we find that heterogeneity tends to be very large in 
conceptual replications but moderate in close replications. Our investigations regarding the 
drivers of heterogeneity show that moderators do little to account for heterogeneity. We also 
find a previously unexplored strong relationship between heterogeneity and effect size, which 
allows us, for the first time, to make predictions about expected levels of heterogeneity for a 
given phenomenon. These findings have clear implications for the improvement of our 
collective research practice, as we discuss at the end of our paper. 
 
Method 
Study Search and Selection Strategy 
We intended to investigate all available Many-Labs type replications. We searched 
Curate Science (2017) for relevant reports in April 2017 and added studies from Many Labs 2 
(Klein et al., 2018) at a later stage. Further, we thought to investigate 50 meta-analyses each 
from cognitive, organizational, and social psychology. Feasibility, rather than power 
considerations, determined this choice. Our pre-registered study protocol is available at: 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=bf46k8.  
We searched PsycINFO, journals only, for “meta-analy*” in the abstract field, in 
November 2016. We restricted searches to PsycINFO classifications “3000 Social 
Psychology”, “3600 Industrial and Organizational Psychology”, and for cognitive psychology 
HETEROGENEITY AS A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON PROGRESS 
12 
 
“2340 Cognitive Processes”, “2343 Learning and Memory”, and “2346 Attention”. Not 
enough eligible meta-analyses could be obtained in this way (see below for inclusion 
criteria). We therefore searched Web of Science, articles only, for “meta-analy*” in the 
categories “Psychology Social”, “Psychology Applied”, and “Psychology”, excluding meta-
analyses that fell outside our target sub-disciplines (see Figure 3). These were inspected in 
random order until we reached the desired number of 50 meta-analyses. 
Inclusion criteria. For the three sub-disciplines, meta-analyses were included if they 
met all of the following criteria. i) It addressed a substantive psychological effect (rather than, 
for example, the psychometric properties of a questionnaire). ii) The analyzed effects were 
described as standardized mean differences (Cohen’s d, Hedge’s g) or correlations (Pearson’s 
r, or Fisher’s Z). Standardized differences and correlations are closely related concepts, and 
one can easily be converted into the other. Similar conversions are less sensible were 
categorical dependent variables were used (Ferguson, 2009), and our heterogeneity measure 
T is also not suitable for these types of effect sizes. For this reason, we excluded meta-
analyses that used odds ratios, risk ratios, and similar measures. iii) Effect size and sample 
size information was provided for the original studies. This was necessary to calculate 
heterogeneity. Where only the sample sizes or effect sizes were available, an attempt was 
made to obtain missing data from the corresponding author. iv) For practical reasons, the full 
article had to be available in English. All close replication reports that met the same criteria 
(Many Labs 1, 2 and 3, and Registered Replication Reports 3 to 6) were included (Cheung et 
al., 2016; Ebersole et al., 2016; Eerland et al., 2016; Hagger et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2014; 
Klein et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 2016)3. 
 
3 For Many Labs 2 (Klein et al., 2018), effect sizes for individual studies were not reported, 
but we could compute them from the published raw data.  
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In this way, we identified 50 meta-analyses for cognitive, organizational, and social 
psychology each, and 57 for close replications (see Supplementary Table 1).  
Data extraction and analysis. Where the results of more than one meta-analysis 
were reported, the one including the largest number of studies was extracted. If multiple 
meta-analyses included the same number of studies, the first was used.   
Heterogeneity for each meta-analysis was computed using the DerSimonian-Laird 
estimator in Metafor in R (Viechtbauer, 2010)4. In order to keep effect sizes and levels of 
heterogeneity consistent across studies, all effect sizes were input as Cohen’s d. All other 
effect sizes were converted accordingly.  
It turned out that the frequency distributions for some of our observed outcome 
variables were right skewed. For example, among the 150 meta-analyses, T had a skewness 
0.99 (the largest Z score being 3.57). We therefore report winsorized means (Mwin), and 
respective standard deviations (SDwin). Winsorizing replaces the smallest and largest values in 
a distribution (in this case the smallest 10% and largest 10%) with the observations that are 
closest to them. Where frequency distributions are normal in nature, this will not alter the 
results. Mwin therefore removes the undue effect of outliers, but retains much more 
information than the median, which trims all scores but the one in the middle of the 
distribution (Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008). Specifically for T, Mwin should also counteract 
the likely overestimation resulting from setting negative heterogeneity estimates to T = 0. We 
use the Yuen-Welch method (Wilcox, 2005), which is similar to the t-test but based on Mwin, 
for group comparisons of T. Similarly, we use winsorized correlations, rwin (Wilcox, 2005). 
 
4 We also computed analyses using the widely used Hunter-Schmidt, Paule-Mandel, and 
REML estimators. These led to similar results (see Supplementary Table 2) and the same 
conclusions.  
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These limit the effect of outliers, but retain more information than Spearman’s rank-based 
correlation, rs.  All data and further materials can be found at https://osf.io/yr3xd/.  
 
Results  
How Meta-Analyses Address Heterogeneity 
Out of 150 meta-analyses, 123 tested moderators, but only 83 (55%) reported a 
measure of heterogeneity. In 2009, the influential PRISMA guidelines (Preferred Reporting 
Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses, Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, & Altman, 
2009) recommended that meta-analyses should address heterogeneity. Even in post-2009 
meta-analyses, heterogeneity was only reported in 60% of cases. Interestingly, statistical 
significance of heterogeneity, e.g. Q, was widely reported (77 times); of those, 45% did not 
report quantifying information. This focus on statistical significance and neglect of 
quantifying information runs counter to the meta-analysis estimation perspective (Hunter, 
1997).  
Overall, heterogeneity was quantified in less than a third of cases (43 times out of 
150): I2 was reported in 33 cases, T2 in 9, and another measure was reported once. In addition 
to the observed neglect of quantification, it is interesting that authors unanimously reported 
T2 (the heterogeneity variance) instead of T (the standard deviation). Whereas standard 
deviation has a meaning that is comparatively easy to grasp (it approximates the average 
difference from the mean), variance does not have a similarly accessible interpretation. (This 
is why researchers most commonly report standard deviations, and not variances, in their 
descriptive statistics. Similarly, we can picture standard deviations in Figure 2, but would be 
lost with variances.)  
Heterogeneity Observed in Close Replications and Meta-Analyses 
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Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for close replications and meta-analyses. As 
expected, heterogeneity was much lower (Mwin = 0.09) in close replications than in the meta-
analyses (Mwin = 0.33), t(94.9) = 10.43, p < .001 (see Figure 4). 
Contrary to our hypothesis, levels of heterogeneity were very similar across all three 
sub-disciplines (cognitive versus social psychology: t(57.3) = 0.33, p = .370 (1-tailed); social 
versus organizational: t(57.0) = 1.17, p = .125 (1-tailed); organizational versus cognitive: 
t(54.9 = 0.74, p = .463 (2-tailed). 
Moderators  
In order to investigate to what extent moderators account for heterogeneity, we looked 
at all 36 meta-analyses with k ≥ 60, because moderators will be most reliably identified in 
large meta-analyses. We looked only at meta-analyses where moderators were reported by 
the original authors. Where possible, we used the strongest moderator for which sufficient 
information was reported for further analyses. All moderators thus identified were grouping 
variables (i.e. none was continuous). We used these moderators to partition studies into 
appropriate subsets, which left us with 22 meta-analyses. We then excluded broad subsets. 
For example, Baker, Peterson, Pulos, and Kirkland, R. A (2014) looked at intelligence and 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes”. The strongest moderator they examined was the type of 
intelligence test used. Based on this, studies were split into two subsets: IQ measured using 
the Wechsler IQ test, and IQ measured using any other test. We excluded the broad ‘other’ 
subset and compared this T against the T in the initial overall meta-analysis. Average T in the 
22 subsets (Mwin = 0.33) was very similar to average T in the corresponding 22 overall meta-
analyses (Mwin = 0.37), t(13) = 1.39, p = .187. Powerful moderators might only emerge when 
they are based on theoretical considerations (Tipton, Pustejovsky, & Ahmadi, 2019a, 2019b). 
We therefore looked at those 10 out of the 22 meta-analyses that presented a theoretical 
rationale for the moderator. Again, we used these moderators to split the studies from each 
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meta-analysis into appropriate subsets and repeated the previous analysis. We found that 
average T in the 10 moderator-based subsets (Mwin = 0.37) was again very similar to average 
T in the 10 corresponding overall meta-analyses (Mwin = 0.37; t(5) = 0.73, p = .499).   
This moderator analysis does not suggest that the large heterogeneity in our meta-
analysis sample is readily explained by mixing apples and oranges. Still, the possibility 
remains that authors (potentially unwisely) combine highly diverse studies and then fail to 
address relevant moderators. In order to address this point, we rated (on a single, global five-
point scale, from ‘low’ to ‘high’) for each meta-analysis how broad or narrow its inclusion 
criteria were. Ratings considered to what extent the addressed question was broad (e.g. ‘How 
effective is psychotherapy?’) versus narrow (e.g. ‘How effective is cognitive behavioral 
therapy to treat simple phobias?’); to what extent the manipulation of the IV and the 
measurement of the DV followed a standard protocol; and the similarity of the samples 
included. Ratings were conducted by the second author without knowledge of the actual 
levels of heterogeneity; to establish reliability, a random sample of 30 meta-analyses were 
independently re-rated by the first author. We computed inter-rater agreement as Cohen’s 
kappa using quadratic weights and observed κw = 0.73, which is typically interpreted as good 
(Jakobsson & Westergren, 2005). For the 58 meta-analyses whose broadness of inclusion 
criteria was rated ‘low’ or ‘low-to-medium’, average heterogeneity was still very high (Mwin 
= 0.29). In other words, if authors generally avoided meta-analyses that integrate fairly 
diverse studies, levels of observed heterogeneity would probably not be much lower. In sum, 
our analyses do not support the view that unwise mixing of apples and oranges is a strong 
driver of observed heterogeneity in meta-analyses. 
Exploratory Analyses on what Drives Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity differed substantially between meta-analyses (SDwin = 0.11). This begs 
the question, why? A number of ideas have been proposed that we can test here. Kenny and 
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Judd (2019) suggested that research areas with larger average effect sizes should have greater 
levels of heterogeneity. We therefore correlated mean d with T. In support of this idea, we 
found a strong correlation rwin = .49 (p < .001) for the set of 150 meta-analyses (see Figure 5). 
This replicated across all three sub-disciplines (cognitive: rwin = .34, p =.019; social: rwin = 
.52, p <.001; organizational: rwin = .62, p <.001). The relationship between mean d with T 
also held for the set of 57 close replications, rwin = .48 (p <.001), see Figure 5. The observed 
relationship between d and T might, at least partly, arise from differences in participants’ 
motivation across studies. When the treatment has a strong effect, it should typically make a 
big difference whether participants engage well with the study or not; when the treatment has 
only a small effect, such differences should be less consequential (Weiss et al., 2017). 
In light of the link between mean d and T, the direct comparison of heterogeneity in 
close replications versus meta-analyses might appear doubtful. This is because mean d 
proved considerably lower in close replications (0.31) than in meta-analyses (0.47). 
Correction via the relevant regression equation (Figure 5) suggests an average T of 0.27 for 
meta-analyses at d = 0.31 (the average for close replications). This is still much larger than 
that observed for close replications (Mwin = 0.09).  
Looking at systematic reviews in healthcare, IntHout et al. (2015) found that small 
studies are more heterogeneous (measured as T2) than large ones. We therefore worked out 
the median sample size for each meta-analysis and correlated this with T. This resulted in rwin 
= -.10 (p = .108, 1-tailed), not suggesting an important role for average sample size. 
Richard et al. (2003) proposed that as a research field matures, the focus shifts from 
establishing an effect to exploring its boundaries, and this should increase heterogeneity in 
findings. If we accept the number of studies (k) as a proxy for the maturity of a research field, 
we should expect a positive correlation between k and T. In line with this idea, they found a 
correlation of r = .11 in a large survey of meta-analyses in social psychology. For our 150 
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meta-analyses, we found rwin = .23 (p =.005) in support of this idea. An obvious alternative 
interpretation is that meta-analyses with broader inclusion criteria cast a wider net and will 
therefore include more studies than those that use narrow inclusion criteria (Murphy, 2017).  
We thought to test these two competing explanations (exploring boundaries versus 
broader inclusion criteria). If later research into an effect tends to explore its boundaries, we 
would expect to see higher heterogeneity in studies conducted late than in those conducted 
early. We therefore looked at all meta-analyses that seemed to capture a sufficiently mature 
research area, and included those 82 with k ≥ 30 and a time range for included studies of ≥ 10 
years. For each of these, we then determined T separately for the earlier and the latter half of 
the included studies. Although the difference was in the expected direction (early: Mwin = 
0.336, SDwin = 0.097; late: Mwin = 0.342, SDwin = 0.110), it was small and not statistically 
significant (t(49) = 1.01, p = .319), therefore not supporting the idea of boundary exploration.  
If the observed correlation between k and T is down to broader inclusion criteria, we 
would expect to see that meta-analyses with broader inclusion criteria show higher T. We 
therefore correlated our ratings of the broadness of inclusion criteria with T and found rwin = 
.12 (p = .142). This does not offer strong evidence that the observed correlation between k 
and T reflects broadness of inclusion criteria. In sum, our data do not offer a clear explanation 
why T tends to increase with k. 
 
Discussion 
 We found that quantification of heterogeneity in meta-analyses is uncommon. Where 
it is undertaken, authors rarely rely on the measure that we argue is most informative. 
Average heterogeneity proved T = 0.33 for meta-analyses, with powerful (or even decent) 
moderators being conspicuously absent, and T = 0.09 for close replications. Heterogeneity 
showed a strong positive association with average effect size. Although based on exploratory 
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analyses, strong consistency across all three sub-fields and close replications lends credence 
to this finding.  
Recently, the effect of heterogeneity on statistical power and its implications for the 
interpretation of low replicability rates in the OSC (2015) project received considerable 
attention (Shrout & Rodgers, 2018; Stanley et al., 2018). We address these more specific 
issues here. We discuss more general implications for the progress of psychological science 
in the General Discussion.  
The Meaning of Observed Heterogeneity Levels 
It is helpful to first consider the meaning of average heterogeneity levels (T = 0.09 for 
close replications and T = 0.33 for meta-analyses). As we discussed earlier, this partly 
depends on the effect size, which averaged d = 0.31 and d = 0.47 (winsorized means for close 
replications and meta-analyses, respectively)5. The average result for meta-analyses is 
depicted in Figure 2 (solid line). Remember that Cohen’s d of 0.2/0.5/0.8 are often considered 
as benchmarks for small/medium/large effects. All of these occur frequently in the 
distribution of population effect sizes for the average meta-analysis. Therefore, observed 
heterogeneity in conceptual replications appears large. In contrast, the average close 
replication showed moderate variability in population effect sizes.  
We further illustrate the meaning of heterogeneity with two examples from cognitive 
psychology. With the importance of working memory for second language proficiency 
development and processing being debated, Linck, Osthus, Koeth, and Bunting (2014) 
investigated the strength of this link in a meta-analysis. Included studies used a range of 
 
5 We note that our value for meta-analyses corresponds closely to the average effect size d = 
0.39 observed in a sample of meta-analyses from Psychological Bulletin (Stanley et al., 
2018). 
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working memory tasks and second language comprehension measures in diverse samples. 
The strength of the relationship proved medium in size (d = 0.51), and heterogeneity was 
estimated to be low (T = 0.11) (see Figure 1, left panel). The latter implies high consistency 
of the relationship and ready generalizability across paradigms. In line with this, most 
population effect sizes (mean ± 1SD) should fall in a narrow range of medium sized effects (d 
= 0.40 to 0.62).  
Baker, Peterson, Pulos, and Kirkland (2014) used meta-analysis to investigate the 
degree of independence between general intelligence and mental state understanding. 
Included studies used a range of established intelligence tests in diverse samples, however, all 
used the same widely used test of mental state understanding (Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test). As in the previous example, the strength of the relationship proved medium in size (d = 
0.49), however, heterogeneity was estimated to be much higher (T = 0.35) (Figure 1, right 
panel), even though the same test of mental state understanding was used throughout. Even 
though the observed level of heterogeneity was medium and not large, it already implies low 
consistency of the studied relationship and a lack of generalizability across paradigms. Most 
population effect sizes (mean ± 1SD) should fall in a wide range of very small to large effects 
(d = 0.14 to 0.84). The authors reported a statistically significant moderator, but given its a-
theoretical nature, and the number of moderators tested, it remains debatable if this reflects 
progress in understanding, or successful capitalization on chance (Ioannidis, 2008). 
In sum, it appears that the relationship between working memory and second 
language proficiency is better understood than that between intelligence and performance on 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. More generally, everything else being equal, meta-
analyses with lower heterogeneity will be more informative. 
Potential Biases in Heterogeneity Estimates 
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Before we address implications of these findings in greater detail, it is necessary to 
highlight a number of points regarding the trustworthiness of our estimates. 
Representativeness of our samples. Our sampling of meta-analyses in cognitive, 
organizational, and social psychology was rigorous, and perusal of the topics (see 
Supplement Table 1) confirms a broad coverage of topics typical for these sub-disciplines. 
We did not find evidence for heterogeneity differences across these sub-fields, which might 
indicate that our results generalize more broadly across psychology. This is supported by the 
fact that Stanley et al. (2018), in a broader sample of meta-analyses from Psychological 
Bulletin, found heterogeneity levels (median T = 0.35) very similar to ours (T = 0.33). In 
contrast, representativeness cannot be claimed for our sample of close replications. Owing to 
the novelty of the concept and the enormous effort involved, such Many-Labs type studies 
are relatively rare, focus on effects that are relatively easy to study, and consequently the set 
of original studies that motivated these replications cannot be considered to be representative 
of the three sub-disciplines we studied or psychological research in general. The observed 
difference in average effect size (close replications: d = 0.31, meta-analyses: d = 0.47) 
reinforces this point. It therefore remains unknown how readily the low heterogeneity 
observed in close replications would generalize to psychological research findings in general.  
 Publication bias and questionable research practices. Publication bias (Sterling, 
1959) and questionable research practices (QRPs, Simmons et al., 2011) are problems in the 
psychological research literature (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; McShane, Böckenholt, 
& Hansen, 2016; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Sterling, 1959). Under publication 
bias, only a biased sample of all conducted studies appears in the published literature; 
‘unsuccessful’ studies typically remain invisible. Given that larger as compared to smaller 
observed effects are more likely to be statistically significant (and thus ‘successful’), 
publication bias leads to upwardly biased effect sizes in published studies and meta-analyses 
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(e.g., McShane et al., 2016). In order to achieve statistically significant, and therefore 
publishable, results, researchers might resort to QRPs (e.g., collect a number of similar 
dependent variables, but only report findings from the most ‘successful’ one). QRPs can 
dramatically increase the rate of false-positive results (Simmons et al., 2011) and thus lead 
again to inflated effect sizes in published studies and meta-analyses.  
 Mathematical modelling and computer simulations suggest that publication bias can 
lead to under- or overestimation of heterogeneity, however underestimation tends to be more 
prevalent than overestimation (Augusteijn, van Aert, & van Assen, 2019; Jackson, 2006). 
Also, the overestimation of heterogeneity due to publication bias and QRPs tended to be 
much smaller than the levels of heterogeneity observed in conceptual replications here  
(Hönekopp and Linden, 2019).  From this viewpoint, the very large T in conceptual 
replications cannot be attributed to bias, but instead seems to represent real heterogeneity that 
is not well understood. Our heterogeneity estimates for close replications are not affected in 
this way, because the protocol for Many-Labs type replications precludes publication bias 
and QRPs (e.g., Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). 
Overreliance on WEIRD samples. Studies in psychology, even if they seek to 
address human nature in general, rely almost exclusively on samples from Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Henrich, Heine and 
Norenzayan (2010) argued that WEIRD samples are among the least suitable to make general 
inferences about human nature, and that many phenomena that are well-established in 
WEIRD populations fail to generalize to other populations. Obviously, this is only a concern 
where studies are aimed at human nature, however this is frequently the case. For these cases, 
Henrich et al.’s findings imply that observed heterogeneity would often be higher if 
researchers did not rely almost entirely on WEIRD samples. This should hold equally for 
conceptual and close replications.  
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Accuracy of meta-analyses. For feasibility reasons, we had to rely on reported effect 
sizes for the underlying primary studies. One systematic investigation of meta-analyses in 
medicine found that about 1 in 5 effect size computations for primary studies were erroneous 
(Gøtzsche, Hróbjartsson, Marić, & Tendal, 2007). This should add (error) variance to the 
meta-analysis, and consequently inflate observed heterogeneity. Given the strict protocols 
and high degree of transparency for Many-Labs type studies (e.g. Klein et al., 2014; Klein et 
al., 2018), erroneous effect sizes should be less of a concern for close replications.  
Summary. In sum, our data for cognitive, organizational, and social psychology 
should be fairly representative for these disciplines, and results might generalize fairly well 
beyond. Publication bias, QRPs, and overreliance on WEIRD samples should artificially 
lower heterogeneity estimates; meta-analytic errors regarding the extraction of effect sizes 
from primary studies should have the opposite effect. On balance then, there is no strong 
evidence to suggest that our very high heterogeneity estimates grossly overestimate actual 
levels of heterogeneity. If anything, heterogeneity-deflating biases appear more numerous 
than heterogeneity-inflating biases. Consequently, our results suggest that actual 
heterogeneity is typically very high in sets of conceptual replications. While the 
representativeness of our close-replications sample is unclear, resulting heterogeneity 
estimates should, overall, be less error prone than those for conceptual replications. 
Implications for the Replicability of Close Replications 
 OSC (2015) famously attempted close replications of 100 recent studies. Although 
using larger samples than the original studies, statistical significance was achieved in only 
36% of replications (25% in social psychology and 50% in cognitive psychology). This 
finding has become a catalyst of the controversial debate about the health of psychology 
research, which is still ongoing (e.g., Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Pashler & Harris, 2012; 
Schmidt & Oh, 2016; Simons, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). This is not the place to review 
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this debate (see Zwaan et al., 2018, for a comprehensive summary), but one of its strands is 
of particular interest here. Stanley et al. (2018) suggested that heterogeneity accounts for 
OSC’s low replication rates. Based on only two Many-labs type close replications, the 
authors estimated heterogeneity to be high (T = 0.25). Subsequent power calculations 
demonstrated that heterogeneity should therefore decrease power in the typical psychological 
study to levels that are in line with the low replication rate observed in OSC (2015). 
However, heterogeneity of the order we observed in a much larger sample for close 
replications (mean T = 0.09) reduces statistical power only marginally6. If we stick to sample 
sizes that generate 80% power at zero heterogeneity, power does not drop at all for large 
effects, drops to 78% for medium effects, and to 70% for small effects, as McShane and 
Böckenholt (2014) showed. The mean effect size for the original studies included in the OSC 
(2015) was large (d = 0.87)7. Therefore replication power should not be greatly affected, 
provided that the differences between the OSC replication studies and their original 
counterparts is comparable to the differences in multiple close replications. 
 Moreover, if replication failure reflects heterogeneity-driven low power, as Stanley et 
al. (2018) claimed, the large difference in replication rates between cognitive and social 
psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) should be reflected in larger heterogeneity in 
the latter. Our finding of virtually identical heterogeneity levels across cognitive and social 
 
6 Stanley et al. (2018) based their heterogeneity estimate for close replications on Eerland et 
al. (2016) and Hagger et al. (2016), both of which were part of our much larger sample. 
7 The mean effect size of the original studies underlying the 57 Many-labs type close 
replications was d = 0.75 (SD = 0.37). Regarding the effect size of the underlying original 
studies, Many-labs type close replications and OSC replications are therefore comparable. 
This matters because of the observed link between T and mean effect size (see Figure 5). 
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psychology does not support this view. In conjunction with the low heterogeneity observed in 
close replications, it strengthens the interpretation that the low replication rate demonstrated 
in OSC might be attributable to publication bias and QRPs. In our eyes, this is good news 
because promising strategies to combat these biases have been developed (Munafò et al., 
2017). On a more general level, one may note that the central issue with the OSC results is 
less about the percentage of original results that are true; more importantly, they suggest that 
a key plank in our common standards to accept evidence as valid (p < .05) has little utility 
(Sedlmeier & Renkewitz, 2018, p. 621). 
How Should Heterogeneity be Estimated for Power Calculations? 
 Average levels of heterogeneity (T = 0.33) have quite dramatic effects on power: it 
drops from 80% to 69% for large effects, from 80% to 63% for medium effects, and from 
80% to 56% for small effects (McShane & Böckenholt, 2014). What level of heterogeneity 
should we expect for a new study that is not a close replication? This is an important question 
for proper sample size planning. The researcher’s informed judgment will always be 
necessary, however the following suggestions might appear sensible. Where a relevant meta-
analysis reports T, use this. Where such a meta-analysis only reports the effect size, use T = 
0.18 + 0.30d (see Figure 5) to estimate heterogeneity. Where there is no meta-analysis, the 
heterogeneity can still be estimated (although with lower precision) from the effect size of a 
single study. When we used all effect sizes from all 150 meta-analyses in our sample to 
predict heterogeneity, T = 0.28 + 0.11d was the resulting regression (R = .38). Finally, when 
an effect size estimate is not available, use the mean (T = 0.33).  
 
General Discussion 
We suggested that heterogeneity is a useful perspective to reflect the degree of understanding 
psychology achieves. Science can be described as a quest to explain the apparent complexity 
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of the natural world through simpler, fundamental principles. Empirical cumulativeness 
reflects the extent to which empirical findings fit such a simple or explicable pattern. Ceteris 
paribus, high levels of (unexplained) heterogeneity indicate lower empirical cumulativeness 
(Asendorpf et al., 2013; Hedges, 1987; Murphy, 2017; Richard et al., 2003; Sells, 1963). For 
conceptual replications in three of psychology’s core disciplines (and plausibly beyond, cf. 
Stanley et al., 2018; van Erp et al. 2018), we found that heterogeneity is typically large (see 
Figure 2) and unexplained, with little reason to believe that our estimates are inflated. To add 
some perspective, we can compare typical levels of heterogeneity (variability within a 
specific topic) with the variability in mean effect sizes across meta-analyses (variability 
between topics). Whereas we found T = 0.33 for the former, for the latter we observed SD = 
0.42 across all 150 meta-analyses. In other words, variability within phenomena measured in 
this way is only about 20% less than variability between phenomena. This large heterogeneity 
is sobering, as it reflects low empirical cumulativeness and therefore low coherence between 
the concepts researchers employ and the data observed. On a brighter note, our findings also 
showed that large heterogeneity is not inevitable – in close replications, it was typically of 
moderate magnitude (T = 0.09) – and even hard sciences face some heterogeneity in their 
measurements (Hedges, 1987). 
Before we explore important implications of this twin finding and possible 
improvements for our collective research practice, we address a likely objection to our 
argument that heterogeneity meaningfully reflects the degree of understanding psychology 
achieves.  
Reply to an Objection 
A likely objection is that progress is driven by theories, and that effect sizes tend to be 
irrelevant for most psychological theories (e.g. Baumeister, 2016; Strack, 2017); where effect 
sizes are largely irrelevant, their variability (i.e. heterogeneity) is likewise of little 
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consequence. We think that such a perspective is mistaken for a number of reasons. First, 
even if effect sizes were largely irrelevant, the direction of effects remains of importance: in 
the face of large heterogeneity, the direction of an effect might be difficult to predict. Second, 
effect sizes are by no means irrelevant for progress of understanding, and therefore their 
degree of variability is important, too. Although some psychological theories are not rooted 
in quantitative concepts (e.g. Piaget’s stages in cognitive development), most psychological 
research is rooted in measurement. Given that measurement is regarded as a practically 
indispensable tool for investigation, it seems inconsistent to be disinterested in its result. In 
general, strong theories tend to be specific in the sense that they declare a large range of 
potential observations to be contrary to theory, thereby creating ample scope for the theory to 
be empirically challenged (Kuhn, 1970). Similarly, the ability to make precise predictions is 
often a hallmark of more mature science (Schickore, 2018). Effect sizes are obviously not the 
only route to achieve such specificity, but often they might provide a viable way forward. 
Where heterogeneity is high, such specificity is difficult to achieve. 
Finally, effect sizes are highly relevant for both explanations and practical 
applications. Psychological explanations typically rely on probabilistic relationships – for 
example in mate choice, men tend to put more emphasis on a partner’s physical attractiveness 
than women do (Feingold, 1990) – and, ceteris paribus, stronger effects convey better 
explanations (Woodward, 2003). For example, the sex difference in height (approximately d 
= 2, (cf. Gustafsson & Lindenfors, 2009)) is much stronger than the sex difference in 
relevance of attractiveness for mate choice (approximately d = 0.5). Consequently, “because 
she is a woman” is more suitable to explain why Aminah is shorter than Muhammad than to 
explain why physical attractiveness matters less in her mate search than in his. Where 
heterogeneity is large, it becomes unclear how powerful particular explanations are, which is 
obviously undesirable. Similarly, effect sizes are also highly relevant for practical 
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applications. For example, sleep quality is a particularly strong predictor of adolescents’ well-
being, and for this reason it is a particularly promising lever for improving young people’s 
wellbeing (Gireesh, Das, & Viner, 2018). Again, where heterogeneity is large, the effect of 
any intervention, which might be thought of as another conceptual replication, becomes more 
difficult to predict; and unless the average effect size is large, even the direction of the effect 
of the intervention could be uncertain (Figure 2). In line with this, successful interventions 
can rarely be delineated from research findings but need to be tested (Cowen, Virk, 
Mascarenhas-Keyes, & Cartwright, 2017). 
Implications for Testing Theories 
 Our twin finding of large heterogeneity in conceptual replications and moderate 
heterogeneity in close replications has important implications for the testing of theories. 
 Knowledge as a tool. One relates to the use of knowledge as a tool. Imagine a 
situation where the test of a psychological theory X requires induction of a particular mood. 
Where this is based on a general principle that shows large heterogeneity, a negative finding 
of the test can be blamed on (unreliable) methods and theory X is protected from failure. 
Where heterogeneity thus precludes the meaningful empirical scrutiny of theories, theoretical 
progress will be limited (Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Greenwald, 2012; Kerr, 1998; LeBel & 
Peters, 2011; Meehl, 1978). In this context, the moderate heterogeneity observed in close 
replications (T = 0.09) is encouraging, and it has a clear implication: a test of theory X should 
not rely on a general principal of mood induction but closely stick to a particular, successful 
protocol. This should typically bring about the expected change in mood8. In this context, we 
 
8 Note, however, that our heterogeneity estimate for close replications stems from pre-
registered studies published irrespective of their results. This precludes distortions of their 
effect sizes through publication bias and QRPs, which might often affect other published 
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note that any systematic investigation about which psychological effects are particularly 
reliable (i.e. strong and with low heterogeneity) is curiously absent. 
 Theories’ boundaries. Another implication of our findings is that evaluation of 
theories also requires a broad exploration of the ‘research space’ (Asendorpf et al., 2013), i.e. 
the space defined by the combination of different manipulations of the independent variable, 
different dependent variables, different study populations, etc. As an example, consider the 
set of stimuli employed. If only a single standard set is used in a research domain to evoke 
the expected effect, some theory-irrelevant feature of that set might drive the observed effect 
(Fiedler, 2011). This problem can only be detected by using diverse (but theory-conforming) 
sets of stimuli. Also consider the case where a theory offers a narrow explanation to account 
for an observation (e.g. memory for a word list is improved when the survival value of its 
items is to be judged). If a more general and thus more parsimonious explanation holds (e.g. 
memory for a word list is improved by any judgments that trigger self-referent encoding), this 
can only be discovered by testing instances of the research space that violate the overly 
narrow theory while still holding for the more general account (Fiedler, Kutzner, & Krueger, 
2012; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). 
Meta-analysis and the testing of theories. A good theory should specify its scope. 
To evaluate the theory, meta-analysts must move beyond a narrow focus on the mean effect 
size and its statistical significance and take heterogeneity into account. Obviously, this is not 
a new insight (e.g. Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). However, our 
results regarding the reporting of heterogeneity in meta-analyses suggest this is rarely 
 
results (Ferguson & Brannick, 2012; Kühberger et al., 2014; LeBel & Peters, 2011; Levine et 
al., 2009; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Sterling, 1959). Consequently, close replications based on 
a single published result might be less reliable (OSC, 2015). 
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implemented in practice. One reason might be that frequently used approaches to 
heterogeneity fail to appeal to researchers’ imagination: as we saw, quantification of 
heterogeneity is often missing, or else it is expressed in ways that might elude intuitive 
understanding (I2, T2). An increased focus on T might facilitate thinking about heterogeneity. 
Reducing Unexplained Heterogeneity as a Sensible Heuristic to Advance Understanding 
 Given that unexplained heterogeneity tends to be both large and undesirable, its 
reduction should become an important goal. Among other advantages, this will increase 
coherence between the concepts we use and our observational data; facilitate empirical 
scrutiny of our theories; provide greater clarity regarding the power of the explanations we 
can offer; and facilitate the design of practical applications.  Weiss, Bloom, and Brock (2014) 
offered a conceptual framework for heterogeneity in experiments, which is useful to discuss 
measures to either explain or reduce it.  
A conceptual framework for heterogeneity. From this (perspective Weiss et al., 
2014), heterogeneity in a set of experiments arises from three sources. First, studies can differ 
in their treatment contrasts, i.e. the experimentally induced difference between experimental 
and control group. The second source of heterogeneity are moderators that reside in the 
participants. Thus, if an effect is age-dependent, differences in participants’ age across 
studies will induce heterogeneity. Finally, studies might differ on relevant context 
moderators, e.g. an effect might vary across cultures or situations. Fruitful applications of this 
framework can be found in Weiss et al. (2017). 
 Treatment contrasts. Differences in studies’ treatment contrasts will typically be 
driven by the strength of experimental manipulations. Often, stronger manipulations will 
bring about stronger effects than weaker manipulations. Consequently, variability in the 
strength of manipulations across studies will induce heterogeneity in results. When the 
strength of manipulations cannot be (or is not) properly expressed, it will be difficult to 
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explain this heterogeneity. Un- or underspecified strength of experimental manipulations 
strikes us to be a frequent issue across psychology, which could often be avoided. We take 
the effect of bilateral symmetry on facial attractiveness as an arbitrary example. Correlational 
studies and experiments alike suggest that symmetry increases facial attractiveness (Rhodes, 
2006). If the strength of experimental symmetry manipulations were described in relation to 
the natural variation in facial symmetry on which correlational studies rely, the variability of 
symmetry could be described on a common scale across all studies. These between-study 
differences in variability of symmetry (whether naturally occurring or experimentally 
induced) should be able to explain differences in results across studies and thus reduce 
heterogeneity. We are not aware of such attempts.   
Our suggestion that systematic specification of the strength of manipulations of the 
independent variable will prove helpful is underpinned by the observation that many seminal 
insights in behavioral science relied on description of the independent variable on a ratio 
scale. This is true for probabilities in classical conditioning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), 
operant conditioning (Herrnstein, 1961), perception under uncertainty (Tanner & Swets, 
1954), and judgements and decision making under uncertainty (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); for the temporal relationship of stimuli or 
events and their effects on visual perception (Marcel, 1983), memory (Peterson & Peterson, 
1959), and the discounting of future outcomes (e.g. Frederick, 2002); the physical stimulus 
intensity and its relationship with perceived stimulus intensity (Stevens, 1957); and for 
degrees of genetic similarity, which underpin all estimates of the heritability of psychological 
traits (Plomin, 1990). 
Importantly, differences in studies’ treatment contrasts can also be affected by 
differences in the control groups, particularly in the case of real-world interventions. For 
these, “business as usual” (i.e., what it means not to be assigned to the intervention) will often 
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differ in important ways between studies (Weiss et al., 2014; Weiss et al., 2017). For 
example, an intervention promoting healthy behavior by providing information about health 
risks might create only a small treatment contrast in an environment in which ample 
information on health risks is at hand, but a large treatment contrast in an environment in 
which such information is scarce.  
Person and context moderators. The experimental test of a motivational 
intervention conducted by Yeager et al. (2019) provides an excellent illustration for both, 
person and context moderators. Their short online intervention taught a nationally 
representative sample of US students in secondary education that they can train their 
intellectual abilities similar to a muscle, which proved to have a small positive effect on 
students’ grades. Importantly, the authors hypothesized and confirmed that low achieving 
students would benefit more from the intervention than high achieving students (person 
moderator) and that the intervention would be most effective in schools with supportive peer 
norms (context moderator). 
Meta-analytic search for moderators is most promising when theory-driven (Tipton et 
al., 2019a, 2019b). In this context it is noteworthy that psychologists have devoted great 
energy to describing individual differences in systematic ways (e.g., McCrae & Costa Jr, 
1997) but that comparable approaches to classify situations are, to the best of our knowledge, 
missing. 
Multi-site experiments. Meta-analyses are often limited in their ability to explain 
heterogeneity because relevant information on moderators or other sources of heterogeneity 
is unavailable for some or all of its primary studies. Multi-site experiments, which directly 
address potential moderators in their design, are a promising alternative (e.g., Yeager et al., 
2019). Such experiments are naturally arduous, but collaboration between many researchers 
through crowdsourcing holds great potential for such projects (Uhlmann et al., 2019). 
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Standardized versus original-units effect sizes. Finally, we want to draw attention 
to a points outside Weiss et al.’s (2014) heterogeneity framework. Our treatment of 
heterogeneity was based on description of individual study results using standardized effect 
sizes. This is the norm for meta-analyses and conveys the obvious advantage that studies can 
be sensibly integrated even when they use different dependent variables. Nonetheless, 
standardized effect sizes might not be the best way to capture study results (Baguley, 2009; 
Bond, Wiitala, & Richard, 2003; Tukey, 1969). Table 2 provides an example, in which 
differences in sample means might be said to provide a more accurate description of 
individual results and of their differences across studies. This increase in accuracy might lead 
to reduced heterogeneity estimates and to the clearer emergence of informative moderators. 
The wealth of available data from Many-Labs type close replication studies (in which sets of 
close replications share the same dependent variable) provides rich opportunities to develop 
heterogeneity analyses based on mean differences instead of standardized effect sizes and 
establish if this reduces heterogeneity estimates. If that is the case, we should investigate to 
what extent this can be fruitfully used for the analysis of conceptual replications, too.  
Critics might argue that the portrayed shortcoming in standardized effect sizes (see 
Table 2) undermines our survey of heterogeneity. However, heterogeneity on the scale 
observed by us in conceptual replications cannot result from moderate inaccuracies in 
standardized effect sizes. Large heterogeneity is real and its reduction should therefore 
become an important aim. To judge whether we make progress on this issue and in order to 
learn which strategies are best suited to reduce unexplained heterogeneity, its measurement is 
necessary. The approach we presented here strikes us as the most appropriate currently 
available. 
Outlook 
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Chemists in the 18th century, who did not yet understand the difference between 
compounds and mixtures, realized that substances often combine in fixed proportions (e.g. 
you need 61.5g magnesia to neutralize 100g of sulphuric acid; Leicester, 1965). Although 
useful for their daily practice, they did not attach much importance to this regularity because 
it appeared to lack universality (after all, you can mix one or three spoons of sugar in a cup of 
tea). Early in the 19th century, John Dalton parsed the seemingly incongruous observational 
data in a new way and realized the significance of fixed proportions, thus paving the way for 
measurement of relative atomic weights and atomic theory, a major breakthrough in the 
history of chemistry (Kuhn, 1970). The linear relationship between stars’ distance from Earth 
and the speed at which they move away from us was probably more obvious to perceive: 
within a short timespan, Georges Lemaître and Edwin Hubble independently discovered this 
law and, consequently, the expansion of the universe (Schneider, 2014). These examples 
illustrate two points: (i) regularity in observational data often acts as a lodestar for discovery 
(Simon, 1973); and (ii) even identification of pockets of regularity might be greatly 
beneficial. Reduction of heterogeneity should make it easier for psychologists to perceive 
such regularities, and the prospect of new discoveries might be the strongest incentive to do 
so. We suggested some means to this end. We are sure that, once heterogeneity and its 
reduction receives more of the attention it deserves, the ingenuity of our colleagues will 
greatly add to our own ideas. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 
Sub-discipline No. meta-
analyses 
Mean k per 
meta-analysis 
Mean T (SD) 
Close 
replications  
57 35.2 0.09 (0.07) 
Social 50 35.7 0.31 (0.11) 
Cognitive 50 36.5 0.32 (0.13) 
Organizational 50 38.3 0.35 (0.10) 
Total 150 36.9 0.33 (0.11) 
Note. All means are winsorized.  
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Table 2. Irrelevant differences in standard deviations across studies negatively affect the 
suitability of standardized effect sizes. 
 Control group 
(N = 200) 
Experimental group 
(N = 200) 
Difference d 
Study 1 M = 50.0 
SD = 10.0 
M = 60.0 
SD = 10.0 
10.0 1.00 
Study 2 M = 50.0 
SD = 15.0 
M = 60.0 
SD = 15.0 
10.0 0.67 
Study 3 M = 50.0 
SD = 10.0 
M = 56.7 
SD = 10.0 
6.7 0.67 
Note: Three similar, fictitious studies into the same phenomenon employ the same dependent 
variable. Due to Study 2 employing a more diverse sample, the standardized effect size d 
misleadingly suggests that Studies 2 and 3 obtained the same results, whereas the difference 
in means shows that Studies 1 and 2 obtained the same results. 
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Figure 1. Funnel plots for two meta-analyses 
Note. Left-hand panel: Linck, Osthus, Koeth, and Bunting (2014), investigated the link 
between working memory and second language comprehension. Estimated mean of the 
population of effect sizes d = 0.51, standard deviation of observed effect sizes is 0.36, 
estimated heterogeneity of true effect sizes T = 0.11, I2 = 11. Right-hand panel: Baker, 
Peterson, Pulos, and Kirkland (2014), investigated the link between intelligence and 
performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test. d = 0.49, SD = 0.59, T = 0.35, I2 = 53.  
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Figure 2. Two distributions of population effect size (standardized mean differences). 
Note. The distribution on the left (solid line) shows a population effect size with a mean (δ) 
of 0.45 and a standard deviation (T) of 0.33. The distribution on the right (dashed line) shows 
a population effect size with a mean (δ) of 1 and a standard deviation (T) of 0.33. 
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Figure 3. Sampling of meta-analyses. 
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Additional records identified using 
WebofScience 
(n =   1127) 
(Cognitive n = 585; Organizational 
n = 1221; Social n = 812) 
Records randomly 
sampled and assessed for 
eligibility 
 
Records excluded – article 
did not meet inclusion 
criteria, duplicates 
(n = 1523) 
(Cognitive n = 439; 
Organizational n = 873, 
Social n = 211) 
Records remaining (not 
sampled) 
(n = 1719) 
(Cognitive n = 491; 
Organizational n = 559; 
Social n – 669) 
Studies included in this 
study  
(n = 150) 
(Cognitive n = 50; 
Organizational n = 50; 
Social n = 50) 
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Figure 4. Observed levels of heterogeneity for 57 close replications and for 50 meta-analyses 
(each) in cognitive, organizational and social psychology, with box-plots for Mwin.  
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Figure 5. Heterogeneity as a function of meta-analyses’ mean effect size. Left hand panel: 
150 meta-analyses from cognitive, social, and organizational psychology; right hand panel: 
57 meta-analyses for close replications. 
 
